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1  How to define and measure research output will be discussed in the next section.
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6.1 Background
The previous three chapters looked at issues concerning education. In this chapter we turn to
research. More specifically, we turn to the funding of research in institutions of higher
education. During the last decade competition for research funds and the use of research
evaluations have become key issues in technology and science policy in many OECD countries.
A major factor behind this trend is the growing demand for accountability of public
expenditures, including public research funding, by citizens. Governments and universities are
pressed to make more efficient use of public resources, and to give better account of the use of
these resources.
In this chapter, we discuss the pros and cons of output-based funding of the research
activities of universities. We focus on how it affects the incentives of academic faculty with
respect to research, teaching and knowledge transfer. We draw lessons from the UK, which has
one of the most output-oriented university research funding systems. Since 1986, research by
British universities is evaluated every four or five years in the so-called Research Assessment
Exercise (RAE). The results of this exercise play an important role in research funding by the
government: low-quality research is not funded at all, and research of high quality is rewarded
with relatively generous funding.
In Section 6.2 we discuss the central issues and concepts. A description of the funding and
evaluation system of academic research in the UK is given in Section 6.3. In Section 6.4 we
discuss the effects of the RAE.
6.2 Research funding and economic theory
6.2.1 Pros and cons of output-based funding
The goal of introducing output-based funding (like the introduction of the RAE in the UK in
1986) is to increase the quantity and / or quality of research output.1 Whether this increase will
come about depends on various factors. Furthermore, introducing output-based funding may
also influence activities other than research. In this section we describe the various possible
effects, which are listed in Table 6.1.
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Why would one expect a rise in research output? First, reallocation of resources to the most able
and productive research groups may raise overall research output. This assumes that the
measure of performance that is used accurately reflects marginal research productivity. Little is
known about the production function of research, however. Although one of the few robust
findings is that the distribution of average research productivity over researchers is very skewed,
it is not clear what part of it may be attributed to the ability of researchers (see Stephan, 1996).
Second, allocation of research funds between research units (universities, departments, research
groups or even individuals) on the basis of performance would strengthen their incentives to
provide research effort, and thereby raise their research productivity and eventually aggregate
research productivity.
Whether these positive effects of performance-based funding will actually occur depends on
several factors. First of all, introduction of explicit incentives for research effort may crowd out
intrinsic motivation. Several examples outside the field of science where this crowding-out is
supported by the data are described by Frey and Jegen (2000). The relevance for science is
unknown.
A second assumption is that individual effort has a positive effect on aggregate research
productivity. This relation need not apply due to the tournament character of science. The norm
of “priority of discovery” is generally thought to play an important role in academic research:
being the discoverer of new (path-breaking) knowledge enhances one’s reputation and future
research career (see Dasgupta and David, 1994). This importance of being first may give rise to
acts of secrecy in the communication of intermediate research results with other researchers
(the opponents in the tournament). This possibly tempers a positive effect of explicit incentives
on aggregate research productivity.
Whether output-based funding succeeds in raising research quality and / or quantity also
depends on the quality of the output measures. Several imperfections of research output
measures have been identified in the literature.
Table 6.1 Theoretical pros and cons of output-based research funding at universities
Pro Con
- allocation to (currently) most able researchers - adverse incentives for non-measurable research effort
- incentives for measurable research effort - no funds to new, talented researchers
- crowding-out of intrinsic motivation
- bias toward low-risk, short-term research and well-established
research approaches
- low comparability of output between scientific disciplines
- adverse incentives for other faculty activities
- academic “transfer market”
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When part of the research output is not measurable, funding based on objective indicators may
increase measured research output without increasing actual research output. It induces
researchers to concentrate their efforts on the measurable outputs of research, which may be
detrimental to actual output. Consequently, when non-measurable output is important, weak
incentives on measurable output are desirable (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991).
Output-based indicators are necessarily based on past research accomplishments which may
be misleading with respect to future productivity. Accomplishment-based funding tends to shift
the distribution of funds toward older researchers and research units, at the cost of young
researchers, re-entering women and new research units that may be more productive in the
future, but have had less possibility to express their potential (Lazear, 1997). A similar reasoning
applies to new research areas and new approaches versus established ones.
The length of the evaluation period is important as well. Research output is not only the
result of effort and ability, but also of chance. Indicators that are based on short evaluation
periods may result in one-time luck having long-time consequences due to the so-called
Matthew effect2: successful research, whether due to ability or good luck, enhances reputation
and the chance of obtaining future research funding, and thereby the probability of being
successful in the future. Longer evaluation periods mitigate this influence of luck somewhat. A
short evaluation period may also distract universities from path-breaking, high-risk research –
with results only expected in the long-run – toward short-term and mainstream research with
foreseeable output. This runs counter to the accepted view that university research should focus
on research that would be under-provided by private parties due to external effects and high
uncertainty.
Research is not the only activity of universities. They are also engaged in education and the
transfer of research findings to the general public. The incentives on the three activities should
be balanced in order to prevent that one of them will be crowded out. When education funding
does not depend on education output and the effort academics put into education is hard to
verify, strong financial incentives for research may go at the cost of the quality of education. The
same applies for the transfer of knowledge, which is a legal task but is hardly rewarded explicitly.
Finally, individual institutions may use intrinsically unproductive strategies to increase their
research output. These strategies do not increase the output of the total research system. A
possible example that has featured prominently in public debates concerns poaching of
researchers from other institutions shortly before an evaluation exercise (especially the timing is
unproductive here, since mobility of researchers itself may be very productive).
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6.2.2 Research output and pitfalls in popular output measures
Evidently, output-based research funding requires a notion of what research output is. In
general terms, the output of research is new knowledge. This initially takes the form of tacit
knowledge, i.e. knowledge in the heads of researchers. Transfer of tacit knowledge requires face-
to-face contact, which makes it a relatively expensive affair. To facilitate knowledge transfer, tacit
knowledge may be written down on paper or in bits and bytes: it may be codified. Scientific
papers, journal articles, patents and computer software are all examples of codified research
output.
These codified outputs are the basis of attempts to evaluate the research efforts of
universities, research groups and individual researchers. Evaluation of research has been a
central component of research activity ever since science is conducted in specialised institutions,
beginning in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. It has mainly served two types of
decisions: funding research proposals and research organisations, and formulating a research
strategy.
Various indicators of research output have been developed, all having their pros and cons
The two main quantitative indicators are publication counts and citation analysis. Subjective
peer review plays an important role as well. The remainder of this section discusses the pros and
cons of the different indicators, and is largely based on the overview of international practices
toward research assessment by Geuna et al. (1999).
The method of publication counts takes the sum of publications produced over a given period as
a proxy for research productivity. To account for the quality of publications, different
publications may be given different weights. Weights may differ between different types of
publications (like books, journal articles, and working papers). Different journal articles may
also receive different weights, depending on the journal in which they have been published. One
possibility that has been used is to weigh articles according to the journal impact factor, which is
the mean citation rate of all the articles contained in the journal, and is published annually in
the Science Citation Index Journal Citation Report. Apart from the way quality is taken into
account, several other decisions have to be made. Examples are the maximum number of
publications that is taken into account, the length of the evaluation period, and the way co-
publications are weighed (as a single-authored article, or inversely proportional to the number of
authors, or otherwise).
Despite the different refinements of rough counts that have been applied, this performance
indicator has several shortcomings as a measure of overall research output:
• Research output other than publications (like patents) is left out;
• The acceptance process for publications may be biased (e.g. toward established authors, or
toward research within a familiar field or paradigm), and weighting schemes for journals may
not be representative for the individual articles (Seglen, 1997);
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• The choices about types and number of publications to be included, the weights to be used, the
evaluation period, and the way co-publications are treated, are partially arbitrary.
The use of publication counts (and other indicators) for research groups, departments and
whole institutions raises three additional issues. First, the proxy should be adjusted for the size
of the research unit by taking the number of publications per researcher. Second, the output per
researcher for a department may vary considerably depending on the number of staff in a
department that is included in the indicator (only senior researchers, also Ph.D. students, maybe
all types of faculty). And third, the output of a department may be altered significantly by the
mobility of staff. The different manners of ascribing the output of a researcher to a department
(based on the affiliation at the time of research, or based on the current affiliation) may have a
strong impact on the output indicator.
Citation analysis concerns the counting of the number of times research publications of a
researcher are referred to elsewhere in the literature. It is used to assess the quality of the
research output. Citation indicators are mostly based on the Science Citation Index (SCI) of the
Institute for Scientific Information. Besides the shortcomings mentioned above, particularly
important shortcomings for citation counts are:
• The SCI tends to have a bias in favour of publications in the English language (and especially
towards North American sources), and only the first author is reported in the SCI;
• Citation counts cannot distinguish between positive and negative citations, and may be distorted
by citations to academic friends or by self-citations (although the latter are easier to recognise);
• The choice of citation windows (how many years are considered after the publication) is partially
arbitrary, and may work out negatively for seminal or radical publications that take some time to
be understood, accepted and referred to.
Peer review is the evaluation of research output by peers. Frequently, peers also use quantitative
information about publications and citations in their assessments (sometimes referred to as
informed peer review). In the Netherlands and in the UK, research assessment is mainly based on
informed peer review. The most important shortcoming of peer review as a method of research
assessment is that it is subjective, and may be insufficiently systematic and transparent. In
principle, this may result in:
• Dishonest reporting when peers have a stake in the evaluation outcome; 
• A bias in favour of large departments because they are usually better known and contribute to
research in a large number of sub-disciplines; 
• A bias in favour of a department or researcher at an institute because of the good reputation of
the whole institute.
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6.2.3 Research funding and the relation with research assessments: international differences
Most countries use a dual support system to fund academic research: both funding of
institutions (core funding) and funding of research projects. Countries differ in the extent to
which research evaluations play a role. The following approaches to core funding of academic
research can be distinguished (based on Geuna et al., 1999):
• (Partial) allocation on the basis of research performance indicators, either directly (Australia,
Poland) or via an informed peer review process (UK, Hong Kong);
• Allocation on the basis of university size (numbers of students and staff), either completely
(Germany, Italy, Norway and Sweden) or in combination with a small part that is based on
performance (Denmark and Finland);
• Allocation on the basis of negotiation with the relevant ministry, either without any research
evaluation (Austria) or with the use of information from research (and teaching) assessment
(France);
• Allocation on the basis of small adjustments to historical patterns (the Netherlands). Although
research assessment is carried out, it is not linked to funding decisions.
6.3 The Research Assessment Exercises in the UK
The UK has one of the most advanced research evaluation systems in Europe. Since the middle
of the 1980s the UK has had four nation-wide university research evaluations, the so-called
Research Assessment Exercises (RAEs), carried out in 1986, 1989, 1992 and 1996. The next
RAE is planned for 2001.
The results of the RAE have been used to allocate the research funds by the three UK higher
education funding councils (for England, Scotland, and Wales) and by the Department of
Education for Northern Ireland.3 Table 6.2 shows that the funds of these funding councils form
a large part of total research funding. The other major funding source concerns the research
councils, who allocate funds on the basis of research proposals. The share of the funding
councils in total research funding has declined sharply, but they are still the largest single
source.
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In this section we describe the method of research funding used by the funding councils and the
role of the RAE, the main changes through time, and the results of the 1996 RAE (the last
evaluation exercise). Because the funding mechanisms and assessment methods of the four
regions of the UK are practically the same, we concentrate on the funding of research carried
out by the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE).
6.3.1 RAE-based funding and overall funding within the HEFCE
The HEFCE provides funds for both research and teaching. Table 6.3 shows the breakdown of
the HEFCE-funds in teaching, research and special funding for 1999-2000.
Table 6.2 Sources of research funding for UK higher education institutions (percentage of total funding,
unless stated otherwise)
1984 1991 1997
Funding Councils 58.8 47.8 35.1
Research Councils 17.2 20.3 24.1
Other government departments 7.5 6.4 10.4
UK industry 5.6 6 7
Overseas n.a. 5.5 8.5
Charities 6.7 11 13.6
Other n.a. 3 1.3
Total (million pounds) 859 1,989 2,942
Note: n.a. = not available.
Source: HEFCE (2000c).
Table 6.3 Breakdown of HEFCE funding in 1999-2000
million pounds % of total
Teaching 2,930 69.3
Research 855 20.2
   - quality-related research funding 835 19.8
         - mainstream 743.3
         - supervision of research students 65.6
         - London extra costs 26.1
   - generic research funding 20 0.5
Special funding 435 10.3
Transitional funding and flexibility margin 10 0.2
Total funding 4,230 100
Source: HEFCE (2000a).
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slightly different way. This is not discussed any further.
5  Teaching activities are assessed by a separate assessment exercise: the Teaching Quality Assessment (TQA).
6  Sometimes multiple applications from one institution in one subject area were allowed. Since interdisciplinary
research-units may be hard to relate to a single subject area, the RAE sometimes allowed for application in a
second subject area. In these cases, a second assessment panel considered the submission as well.
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The part of HEFCE-funding that is allocated on the basis of the RAE concerns the quality-related
funds, which is almost 98% of the HEFCE research funding. The institutions are free in the
internal allocation of the research funds they receive. The allocation of the mainstream quality-
related funds between institutions takes place in two stages:4
• Allocation of total research funds over the subject areas identified in the RAE;
• Allocation of the funds per subject area over the various institutions.
Both allocations are affected by the quality-rankings resulting from the RAE. We first describe
how the quality-rankings are determined, and subsequently turn to the translation of these
rankings in funding decisions.
6.3.2 The Research Assessment Exercise of 1996
The quality of research is assessed by (informed) peer review in a Research Assessment Exercise
(RAE).5 In this section we discuss the RAE of 1996, which will inform funding decisions until
2001-02. This RAE involved the assessment of over 55,000 academics from nearly 3,000
departments in 191 institutions (Geuna et al., 1999). Note that since the introduction of a
unitary university system in 1992, the UK has no formal distinction between the former
polytechnics and related institutions (comparable to the Dutch HBO) and the “traditional”
universities (comparable to the Dutch universities). Hence, all institutions of higher education
are assessed and funded according to the same rules.
At the beginning of the 1996-exercise, 69 subject areas were defined (called Units of
Assessment, UOAs). In each subject area the research output has been assessed by one of the
60 assessment panels of on average six to ten experts. Panel members, some 560 in total, were
selected on the basis of nominations by about 1,000 outside bodies (subject associations,
learned societies, professional bodies and organisations representing users of research).
Institutions were invited to put forward one application in each subject area.6 The crucial
information for the research assessment has been the research output of the so-called research
active staff. Institutions were free in the selection of researchers as research active staff. It is
important to note that the academic staff that is not submitted as research active does not add to
the research volume of institutions as well. Hence, institutions basically face a trade-off between
quantity and quality. The 1996-RAE did not assess all the output of the research active staff, but
considered up to four works (publications or other forms of assessable and publicly available
output).
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The research assessment resulted in a rating for each research unit (see Table 6.4). These
ratings reflect the extent in which research in a unit has achieved levels of national or
international excellence. Rating 1 implies “research quality that equates to attainable levels of
national excellence in none, or virtually none, of the sub-areas of activity” and rating 5* means
“research quality that equates to attainable levels of international excellence in a majority of sub-
areas of activity and attainable levels of national excellence in all others” (Geuna et al., 1999).
The ratings are thus meant to reflect the level of research quality, and not the position of a
department in a research quality tournament where a higher rating of one department
automatically means a lower rating for another department. In theory it is possible that all
departments receive the highest rating of 5* or the lowest rating of 1.
The average ratings differ substantially between subject areas. The three lowest average ratings
(after translating the rankings to a scale from 1 to 7) are 2.4, 2.8 and 2.8, whereas the scores of
the three highest rated subject areas are 5.1, 5.4 and 5.6. The difference between subject areas
may reflect true quality differences, but may also be the result of different perceptions by
assessment panels of the quality-ratings. These differences in average scores have increased in
importance, since from the 1996 RAE onward the allocation of the total budget over the subject
areas depends on the quality-ratings (prior to this date the budgets per subject were determined
before the assessment).
6.3.3 From RAE-ratings toward allocation of funds
As mentioned before, the allocation of the quality-related research funds proceeds in two stages:
allocation of the total funds between the subject areas (Stage 1), and allocation of the funds per
subject area between institutions (Stage 2). The RAE-ratings influence the outcome of both
stages.
In Stage 1 the total funds are allocated between the different subject areas. The share of each
subject area in total funding is proportional to the volume of research in the subject area times
the relevant cost weight.
There are three cost weights, reflecting differences in costs of research: for high cost
laboratory and clinical subjects (weight 1.7), for intermediate cost subjects (weight 1.3) and for
other subjects (weight 1.0).
Table 6.4 Distribution of 1996 RAE-ratings over departments
Rating 1 2 3b 3a 4 5 5*
Research department (% of total) 8.2 16 18.2 14.6 23.2 13.9 5.9
Source: RAE96-database (see www.rae.ac.uk).
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represents an average period of study for a full-time research degree.
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The volume of research is the weighted sum of five separate components:
• The number of FTE research active academic staff funded from general funds, in departments
rated 3b or above, and selected for assessment in the RAE (weight 1);
• The number of FTE research assistants (weight 0.1);
• The number of FTE research fellows (weight 0.1);
• 1.75 times the FTE number of postgraduate research (PGR) students in their second and third
year of full-time study, or third to sixth year of part-time study (weight 0.15);7
• The average of last two years’ research income from charities, divided by 25,000 (weight 0.25).
Income from charities is divided by 25,000 (in pounds the average salary of a researcher) to
obtain a personal equivalent.
The number of research active staff is the most important measure of volume: it accounts for
about two-thirds of the total volume. The volume of research active staff is fixed between two
RAEs. The other components of research volume are updated annually.
In Stage 2 the funds per subject area are allocated over the various institutions. For each subject
area, the share of an institution in the total funds is proportional to the volume of the research
unit it has put forward for assessment in the subject area, times the funding weight of the
research unit. The volume of research for each institution in each subject is measured as in
Stage 1.
The funding weight follows from the quality-ranking of the research unit determined in the
RAE. Table 6.5 shows how the ratings relate to the funding weight. Ratings 1 and 2, which
amounts to 24.2 percent of the departments (see Table 6.4), generate no quality related funding.
Each rating point between 3b and 5 attracts a weight 50 percent greater than the previous point,
while the step from 5 to 5* implies a 20 percent premium.
6.3.4 Changes in RAE through time and plans for the RAE of 2001
Through the years the HEFCE has continually evaluated and reviewed the research evaluation
process and the funding system. This section describes the major changes since the RAE of
1989 (see Table 6.7). The first RAE (of 1986) will not be discussed, since it has been strongly
Table 6.5 RAE ratings and corresponding funding weights
1996 RAE rating 1 2 3b 3a 4 5 5*
Funding weight 0 0 1 1.5 2.25 3.375 4.05
Source: HEFCE (2000a).
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criticised for its lack of transparency and the subsequent changes have been very substantial. In
discussing the changes we will follow Table 6.7.
A major change that does not concern features of the RAE itself, but has resulted in debates
about the RAE, has been the introduction of the unitary system of higher education in 1992.
The formal distinction between the polytechnics and other institutions (comparable to the Dutch
HBO) and the “traditional” universities (comparable to the Dutch universities) was abolished,
and all the institutions of higher education have subsequently been assessed and funded
according to the same rules.
The inclusion of the “new” universities in the RAE has also led to a number of changes in
the determination of research output relevant for the RAE:
• Grants for teaching and research were separated. Student numbers were removed from the
research funding formula, and research students, research assistants and fellows were included.
This change has been structural;
• The choice of which academic staff to include in the research assessment was decentralised
toward the institutions. Before 1992 all academic staff was subject to evaluation. Ever since the
institutions have been free to put forward so-called research active staff. In this choice
institutions face a trade-off between quality and quantity: academic staff that is not submitted as
research active does not add to the volume of research as well;
• The relation between ranking and funding was changed (see Table 6.6). 
This change had the important consequence that the lowest ranked units no longer received
quality-related funds, whereas previously all units received some funding;
• Basic research and applied research could be evaluated separately. This change has only lasted
one period; in the 1996-RAE they were integrated again. The change was inspired by the
possibility of an excessive focus of the review panels on output measures that were favourable to
basic research (like publications in scientific journals), and thus for the old universities. Separate
evaluation proved to be cumbersome and added little to creating a level playing field, and was
thus cancelled in the next exercise.
The number of quality categories and the correspondence between quality-ratings and funding
weights has been changed several times. The first change, described above, basically introduced
a category of institutions receiving no quality-related research funding. In 1996, the number of
Table 6.6 RAE ratings and corresponding funding weights for 1989 and 1992
RAE rating 1 2 3 4 5
1989 funding weight 0.5 1.5 2.5 3.5 4.5
1992 funding weight 0 1 2 3 4
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quality categories has been increased by two. Basically, both the old category 3 and the old
category 5 have been split in two. Furthermore, the lowest two quality categories received no
funding from 1996 onward. These changes occurred in response to the general rise in quality
rating. Due to this rise the departments that had been able to maintain their position in the top
category had nevertheless seen their funding per unit of research volume decline, which was
considered undesirable.
Another feature that has been changed several times is the quantity of output that is
evaluated. In 1989 there were no rules. In 1992 researchers had to mark with an asterisk the two
pieces of output they considered to be best. In 1996, the number of outputs counting for the
quality assessment was drastically reduced to four pieces. This change has been made in
reaction to the publication explosion following the 1992 RAE. The new arrangement has
reduced the incentive to maximise the number of articles by repetition, by lowering the quality
standards, or through the breakdown of research into lowest publishable units (Cave et al.,
1997).
Until 1996, the distribution of funds between the subject areas did not depend on the quality
ratings. Since then, the quality of research no longer only determines the distribution of funds
within a subject area, but also influences the distribution of the total budget between the subject
areas. As explained earlier in the chapter, the amount of funds allocated to a subject area
depends strongly on the research volume, which only takes into account the number of research
active staff in departments that exceed a minimum research quality (have a rating of 3b or
above). This raises the question of the comparability of quality between different disciplines; a
question that is especially interesting given the great spread of average ratings between subject
areas. This structure may give assessment panels an incentive to overrate the average quality of
research output in order to maximise the share of the own subject area in the total research
budget.
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The last change, which will be made in the 2001-RAE (and does not appear in the table),
concerns the rules for submitting staff that has left an institution shortly before the research
evaluation exercise. A “research active researcher” who transfers between two institutions that
are eligible to participate in the RAE within the twelve months preceding the census date will be
taken into account in the judgement of quality for both institutions, but will only be counted in
the research volume of the employing institution at the census date. This change has been made
in reaction to references to an academic “transfer market”, and should ensure that institutions
will not be disadvantaged by staff leaving immediately before the RAE.
6.4 Evaluation of the RAE
What have been the consequences of the RAE? How effective has the RAE been in achieving its
goals? And what about unexpected side-effects? This section discusses the impact of the
subsequent RAEs. It is mostly based on the main evaluation studies of subsequent exercises:
Table 6.7 Differences between the subsequent RAEs
1989 1992 1996 2001
Funding period 90/91-92/93 93/94-96/97 97/98-00/01 01/02 - ...
No. of subject areas 152 72 69 68
University system binary (55 institutions) unitary (170
institutions)
unitary (191
institutions)
unitary
Funding of teaching
and research
separated?
no yes yes yes
Staff assessed all staff research active staff
(selected by the
institutions)
research active staff
(selected by the
institutions)
research active staff
(selected by the
institutions)
Funding weight as a
function of the quality
rating
see Table 6.6 see Table 6.6 see Table 6.5 see Table 6.5
Separate ratings for
basic and applied
research?
no yes no no
No. of quality
categories
5 (see Table 6.6) 5 (see Table 6.6) 7 (see Table 6.5) 7 (see Table 6.5)
Budget per subject area set before exercise set before exercise endogenous endogenous
Research output per
researcher assessed
not specified two publications + two
other output + other
research info
best four best four
Sources: McNay (1999), Williams (1993), www.rae.ac.uk.
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teaching, and the nature of research. It involved a literature study, case studies, questionnaires and interviews.
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Williams (1991)8, Martin and Skea (1992)9, McNay (1997 and 1999)10, and the HEFCE Review of
Research (HEFCE, 2000b) including the underlying reports.
First a short word about the costs. According to calculations by the HEFCE, an upper limit
on the total costs of the 1996-exercise is £37,5 million, just 0,8% of the total funds allocated on
the basis of the RAE-results (HEFCE, 2000b).
The total amount of money that changes departments due to the RAE is about 30% of the
total funds. Despite these gross money flows, the share of the old pre-1992 universities and the
share of the new universities in total funding remains approximately constant (HEFCE, 2000b).
The financial consequences for departments may be larger than these figures indicate. This is
due to the fact that the RAE-ratings not only determine HEFCE-funding, but also increasingly
influence the allocation of other research funds (McNay, 1997). Firms, for example, use the
ratings when choosing a research group for contract research or long-time research
collaboration.
6.4.1 Research output
The first indications of changes in research output are the changes in quality ratings, reported in
Tables 6.8 and 6.9. The changes indicate a steady rise in the quality of research. From 1989 to
1992, 50% of the submissions improved its rating and 35.4% consolidated its rating. The
remaining institutions either saw their rating decline or dropped out. From 1992 to 1996 51.7%
improved its rating and 31.1% received the same rating in both years.
Table 6.8 RAE grade movements from 1989 to 1992
1992 submissions 1992 rating
1989 rating 0 1 2 3 4 5 Total
0 90 80 106 47 36 359
1 41 13 45 49 10 1 159
2 37 5 107 189 58 8 404
3 31 0 46 284 176 48 585
4 10 0 1 72 181 86 350
5 8 0 1 6 44 143 202
Total 127 108 280 706 516 322 2,059
Note: Rating 0 indicates “received no rating”.
Source: HEFCE (2000b), Annex J.
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Two questions remain: is the improvement suggested by the increase in ratings real, and can it
be attributed to the RAE? The last question is a very difficult one. McNay (1997) emphasises that
the effects of the 1992 RAE are hard to disentangle from the effects of other policy changes that
took place at the same time: (i) the creation of the unitary system, discussed earlier; (ii) a freeze
on the expansion of undergraduate student numbers; (iii) the introduction of teaching quality
assessment (TQA), although without significant resource consequences attached; and (iv) more
emphasis of government policy on the contribution of academic research to competitiveness and
economic strength. Additionally, some rules of the 1992 RAE were changed unexpectedly
shortly before the submission deadline.
An international comparison may provide some indications of the efficiency of UK academic
research. In 1997, the UK had the largest number of papers and number of citations per dollar
(PPP) of higher education R&D expenditures. On the other hand, research funding as a
proportion of GDP and the proportion of research funding provided by the government are
relatively low internationally (HEFCE, 2000b). At first sight this suggests that UK research does
indeed make efficient use of the research resources (although differences in research systems,
like the focus in Germany on public research in specialised research institutions instead of in
higher education institutions, make firm conclusions difficult).
Additional evidence is provided by surveys of researchers and university administrators. This
evidence has the major drawback that it is based on perceptions and opinions, which frequently
differ between individuals (even apparently similar ones). Williams (1991), McNay (1997) and
Adams et al. (2000a) found evidence of improvements in research management: more
conscious and transparent planning and monitoring of research, and closure and merger of low-
rated departments. Many insiders think research quality has increased, although this is
accompanied by more stress among staff.
Table 6.9 RAE grade movements from 1992 to 1996
1996 submissions 1996 rating
1992 rating 0 1 2 3 4 5 5* Total
0 126 207 131 30 14 7 515
1 180 78 84 60 2 0 1 405
2 87 28 130 290 44 4 0 583
3 64 2 36 370 271 54 5 802
4 13 0 0 79 254 162 22 530
5 6 0 0 4 43 150 120 323
Total 350 234 457 934 644 384 155 3,158
Note: Rating 0 indicates “received no rating”, rating 3 in 1996 includes 3a and 3b.
Source: HEFCE (2000b), Annex J.
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6.4.2 Funding bias against new researchers
Does the funding system work out negatively for researchers who did not have the chance to
prove their abilities in the recent past, like young researchers and re-entering women? HEFCE
(2000b) finds no evidence for a bias against young researchers. Two observations support this
view. First, the age profile of research active staff submitted to the 1996-RAE is not related to the
grade received. Moreover, research-intensive departments even recruit slightly more younger
staff relative than the sector overall.
HEFCE (2000b) does find an under-representation of women in the highest-rated
departments. The proposed solution is to recognise personal recommendations of peers as
evidence in the RAE. When the absence of research output is due to a temporary retreat from
the academic labour market, an alternative solution might be to consider the research output in
the four years before this retreat.
6.4.3 Bias toward short-term research
McNay (1997) finds indications for several distortions of the nature and content of research. The
evaluation period results in more short-term and mainstream research. He also reports a bias of
review panels toward more favourable treatment of papers in established scientific journals,
leading researchers to focus on more basic research, more mainstream research, and less
interdisciplinary research. How severe these distortions have been does not become clear,
however. HEFCE (2000b) found no relationship between the percentage of time researchers
spend on interdisciplinary research and the rating of their 1996 RAE submission, which
suggests the problem is not large.
6.4.4 Adverse incentives for teaching and knowledge transfer
Martin and Skea (1992) report on concerns among academic staff about the negative effect of
the RAE on teaching. Jenkins (1995) evaluates the effect of the RAE on teaching in fourteen
departments of geography in England and Wales. The paper presents evidence of more teaching
by part-timers and postgraduates (particularly in the first postgraduate year), and clear pressures
to give priority to research productivity in personnel policy, especially in appointments.
Teaching programs tend to become more fragmented, and insufficient new (possibly IT-based)
teaching material is developed. McNay (1997) finds similar effects plus a trend toward
organisational separation of teaching and research. To what extent these effects influence the
educational output remains unclear. Analyses based on proxies for educational output have not
been found.
The (negative) effects of the RAE on teaching and the transfer of knowledge are not evident. J
M Consulting Ltd (2000) found a widespread view that the RAE did not directly damage the
quality of teaching. A negative effect on innovations in teaching, like new teaching material and
the attention paid to student support and tutorials, might be present, although views on this are
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widely differing. Possibly, a decline in teaching quality may yet have to show up. Even when
there is a negative influence of the RAE on teaching and knowledge transfer, the HEFCE-report
concludes that this problem should not be tackled by lowering the incentives on research. Rather
the answer should be found in attaching greater financial consequences to the Teaching Quality
Assessment (TQA), and improving its quality, about which there is much dissatisfaction. A
similar argument applies with respect to knowledge transfer.
6.4.5 Academic transfer market
One of the most frequently mentioned aspects of the RAE has probably been the alleged
“transfer market” for staff in the run-up to an exercise. The fact that institutions are assessed on
the performance of the staff in post on the census date for the RAE has been said (among others
in the survey by Williams) to encourage a frenzied transfer market in the period before an
exercise. The data do not support this hypothesis. McNay (1997) calculated that only about 1% of
total academic staff moved due to the 1992-RAE. The same figure applies to the RAE-related
transfers in the two years up to the 1996-RAE, a period in which the entire sector grew by 25%.
There has been some timing of retirement in the 1996-RAE: in the year following the RAE, the
percentage of staff retiring or moving out of active employment rose from 1.84 percent to 3.30
percent. Mobility may have remained this low because institutions took steps to retain staff, like
salary increases, relief from teaching, sabbaticals and provision of support staff.11 Compared
with the US-researchers and with industrial researchers, UK academic (RAE) researchers are
relatively immobile (HEFCE, 2000b).
6.4.6 In conclusion
Based on all the above, we arrive at the following summary of the findings concerning the
effects of the Research Assessment Exercises in the UK (see Table 6.10).
Table 6.10 Consequences of the UK system of output-based funding, the Research Assessment Exercise
Pro
Research output (research management) weakly positive effect
Con
New researchers / re-entering women no effect / some negative effect
Short-term, mainstream research ambiguous
Teaching weakly negative effect
Knowledge transfer unknown
Academic transfer market no negative effect
